Addressing the National Press Club, Gartrell highlighted the difficult position the ALP now finds itself in: "Because of [the ALP's] two consecutive poor election results, from July next year the Government will take control of the Senate, and the outcome means in the lower house we now need to gain more seats than either Whitlam required in 1972, Hawke required in 1983 or
Howard required in 1996 to win the next election."
In pinpointing interest rates as the key factor determining the election, Gartrell said: "Of the 15 seats with the highest proportion of mortgagees, 11 had a higher than average swing against Labor. For example, the most mortgage-sensitive seat in the country is Holt, where over half the voters are paying off a mortgage. In Holt, the two party preferred swing against us was 6.1
percent, almost three times the national average."
This is the transcript of the address to the National Press Club by Tim Gartrell, National Secretary of the ALP.
INTRODUCTION
Thank you for the opportunity to address the National Press
Club.
Today I'd like to put Labor's perspective on the campaign.
The loser's perspective is rarely written, that's why it's
important today to put our campaign into some context and debunk some of the
myths that swirl around after an election defeat.
It's also important that we acknowledge the loss, our
mistakes and outline the task ahead of us.
Today, I'll be as frank as possible but there will be no
repeat performance of my counterpart's highly censored exit poll that will tell
you that our team is loved by the people (when they answered the right
questions), that our ad team is brilliant and the muffins in the tea room at
the Liberal HQ were far superior to those at 19 National Circuit.
Yes, we all know the victors get to write history but
there's only so much that can go unchallenged.
To start with I'd like to provide an overview of the result.
THE RESULT
From the start I acknowledge this was a very disappointing
result for Labor.
This is despite the fact that in net terms we only lost 3
seats at a time when our economy is perceived to be strong, the international
security situation uncertain and, as the US election shows, the benefits of
incumbency are great.
Having said all that, it's our fourth loss in a row since
1996 and our primary vote now stands at 37.6 per cent - 1.2 per cent less than
when we lost government over eight and a half years ago.
To the credit of many of our marginal seat holders, this
result didn't translate into the same seat loss incurred in 1996.
Labor is still 14 seats net ahead of that result.
However, because of two consecutive poor election results,
from July next year the Government will take control of the Senate.
And the outcome means in the lower house we now need to
gain more seats than either Whitlam required in 1972, Hawke required in 1983 or
Howard required in 1996 to win the next election.
It's a very hard task — but not an impossible one.
In the coming months we'll be analysing the results in more
detail, but for now we have conducted some basic demographic analysis to guide
our thinking in the immediate aftermath of the election.
For starters, we do know it's more complex than simply
asserting that the biggest swings were in the Labor booths.
Take the seat of Bonner for example, in the working class
booths around Wynnum, there was a swing to Labor.
The swings against us occurred in the more affluent parts of
the electorate, and cost Labor the seat.
The theory that the Coalition is now the party of blue
collar workers is simplistic, and misses the major point.
Blue or white collar, tradesperson or professional, the most
important factor was whether people had a mortgage.
This is the glaring lesson from the early analysis we have
conducted.
Seats with the highest proportion of mortgagees were
generally those which recorded the biggest swings against the ALP.
Consider this:
Of the 15 seats with the highest proportion of mortgagees,
11 had a higher than average swing against Labor.
For example, the most mortgage-sensitive seat in the country
is Holt, where over half the voters are paying off a mortgage.
In Holt, the two party preferred swing against us was 6.1
percent, almost three times the national average.
Next on the list of seats with the highest proportion of
mortgagees was Cowan, which saw us suffer a 4.7 per cent swing against an
extremely popular incumbent Labor MP.
The list is long and illustrative; it includes seats like
Aston and McEwen, with swings against Labor of 7.4 per cent and 4.2 per cent
respectively.
While there's no doubt other factors — some of them very
specific and local— were at play in some of these seats, mortgages were the
key.
When you think about it, it's only logical - the interest
rate campaign hit us hardest in the booths around new housing estates and in
the seats with the highest proportions of mortgagees, and these were the booths
and seats where we copped the biggest swings.
THE CAMPAIGN
What happened?
After the 2001 election, Lynton Crosby, in his role as
winning campaign director and chief rewriter of history, sought to argue that
the result was not due to Tampa, the unsubtle use of the race card, or the
focus on national security.
The 2001 result, he claimed, was a sound endorsement of John
Howard as a leader and the mythical third term agenda.
So this time, Brian Loughnane dusted off the Liberal Party
manual and sought to convince you that the voters had once again overwhelmingly
responded to the positive messages of the Coalition campaign.
In his speech he chose to omit the interest rates scare that
dominated the Coalition advertising.
The Coalition campaign was overwhelmingly negative, based on
Republican-style negative advertising and personal attacks.
I think the Coalition should openly acknowledge what they
did in this campaign.
They engineered a very effective and well executed negative
campaign that turned the focus on Labor and away from John Howard's record and
the pending leadership handover.
Despite being based on a total porky, it was an effective
tactic, and it was delivered with discipline and consistency.
We acknowledge this and accept that it won them the
election.
Interest rates, economy, three more years
By the last week of the campaign it became clear there were
two perceptions that were dragging people away from their interest in our
leader, our positive agenda, and a growing mood for change.
The first was the perception that Labor was a threat to low
interest rates.
The lie that interest rates would increase under Labor had
stuck, and washed over Labor's positive agenda.
We heard about this growing unease during the campaign -
from candidates with strong links to their communities, to unionists talking to
members in workplaces and our own research.
The sentiment was best summed up by a woman in a swinging
voter focus group in the middle of the campaign, who said:
"I like what Mark Latham and Labor are on about, I really
want a change, but I'm scared about interest rates"
I'll return to interest rates in a moment.
The second perception, which was just as potent, was that
Mark Latham was inexperienced and needed more time.
This second area of concern was seized upon with a rehash of
the Northern Territory Country Liberal Party's 1994 "L" plate ad — with the "L"
on Latham this time, not Labor.
So, while a majority of voters liked Mark Latham and felt
his agenda was sound, the same people also expressed the view that he would be
even better with another three years in opposition.
They also knew John Howard's time was coming to an end and
they might get a short spell of Peter Costello, a person they had strong
reservations about.
In a logical way many decided they could have the best of
both worlds. They could have both
leaders.
By voting for the Coalition they could get more of the
'devil they knew' - John Howard - even if it meant putting up with a brief
spell of Peter Costello.
Then, at the next election they would be able to vote for a
more experienced Mark Latham, a leader who a majority viewed positively.
To political insiders like us this seems illogical but in
the minds of many disengaged swinging voters it held fast.
In the last week, this notion of "three more years for
Latham" was strong. In fact, according
to our research, it was one of the top three concerns held by voters in target
seats.
Household debt and
interest rates
I'll now expand some more on interest rates and why we
believe it was such a potent issue in the campaign.
The Coalition's interest rate scare was undeniably
effective, based on their success in prosecuting the argument that Labor is the
party of high interest rates.
It's an issue we need to confront as we argue our economic
credentials this term.
But, much more importantly I think, their campaign on this
issue was effective because of the financial situation that so many Australians
find themselves in.
Consider the facts:
Under John Howard, the cost of buying a home has nearly
doubled.
In 1996, it took an average of five and a half years of
wages to buy a house.
Now it's almost ten years.
Mortgage interest payments cost more than ever - the burden
of monthly mortgage debt has risen by more than 50 per cent.
Household debt stands at 766 billion dollars and growing,
compared with 289 billion dollars when the Coalition took office.
And household savings have sunk to new lows, giving
Australian families very little to fall back on if they're suddenly placed
under extra financial pressure.
When Labor left office, Australians were saving $5.80 out of
every hundred dollars they earned.
Now they're going backwards.
Today, for every hundred dollars, they go into debt an
additional $1.90.
Little wonder people were susceptible to a scare campaign,
however misleading, on rates.
Record levels of household debt — not just mortgages but
personal loans and credit cards — have ramped up the fear of economic ruin and
transformed the interest rate issue into a potent scare campaign rivalling
Tampa for it's scale and impact across marginal seats.
This is backed up by quantitative polling conducted three
nights from election day, which gave the Labor team some stark and confronting
news.
A majority of swinging voters agreed that "even though I
think it's time for a change, I can't take even take the smallest risk of
interest rates going up".
In many ways this was the fault line determining the result
on 9 October — a vote for change versus the fear of economic insecurity driven
by the cost of servicing record debt levels.
High-debt households are working hard just to make their
repayments and are receptive to any message that this might be under threat
from a change of government.
As our analysis of the result shows, that's where the scare
campaign resonated most loudly — in the high-debt households of middle
Australia.
This is the real state of play in Australia.
The electorate is not inherently conservative.
Swinging voters have always responded to hip-pocket
concerns, just like they did in 1993 when they voted Labor against the mood for
a change because they wouldn't cop a GST.
In this case, it was the fear of yet another squeeze, and in
the end they decided to vote for "the devil they knew".
Peter Costello
It would be remiss of me not to spend some time dealing with
the biggest post-election myth emanating from the Liberal Party, and that's the
alleged popularity of Peter Costello.
Of all the decisions we made during this campaign, this has
attracted the greatest condemnation and ire of our opponents.
Our decision to highlight the leadership transition has
provoked a howl of derision from the conservatives.
The moment the election result became apparent the Liberal
spin machine went into overdrive — spewing out lines on why Peter Costello was
a great asset during the campaign and mock disbelief that anyone would dare
challenge this.
My opposite number in the Liberal Party spun this by
selectively releasing the response to just one question in exit polling.
Well, when it comes to Peter Costello, the Liberals do
protest too much.
In this case, the level of spin is an indicator of the level
of sensitivity.
Nowhere was this clearer than in their strategy of leaking
exit polling, revealing that voters have a positive view of Peter Costello's
economic stewardship.
That should come as no surprise. Many voters believe we are living in stable
economic times.
The real question, asked by one of you a few weeks ago is:
where are the rest of the survey results?
It beggars belief that Crosby Textor would only ask that
question when it was clear from the rest of the leak that the survey was long
and forensic.
Why not ask people whether they have a positive or negative
view of Peter Costello, or whether he would make a good PM or whether they
preferred Howard to Costello, or Costello to Latham?
We can only be left with the assumption that the rest of the
findings were pretty unfavourable.
So let me respond with a more complete look at the
Treasurer, demonstrating why we chose to campaign on Peter Costello.
Our election tracking research showed that on the final
night of the campaign, the likelihood of a handover to Peter Costello was the
fourth biggest vote switcher away from the Coalition (rating behind time for a
change, John Howard's lack of credibility, and education).
The handover featured at the top of the vote-switching
tables consistently throughout the campaign, reaching as high as number
two.
Peter Costello's ratings were lowest during the final
fortnight of the campaign, and he finished it in a worse position than he
started.
By the end of the campaign the thought of a leadership
handover to Costello made 28 per cent of people less likely to vote for the
Coalition.
Among soft voters it was a staggering 40 per cent.
But it was in the swinging voter focus groups that the level
of passion against Peter Costello was most clearly articulated.
Typical focus group impressions of Costello were "I don't
trust him, I don't like him", "he doesn't like coming out to the
bush", "he's a snake in the grass", and "he's smug".
And, of course, there were many references to the infamous
smirk.
Obviously the Liberal Party is using its victory to attempt
to remake the Costello persona in preparation for the handover.
Our research backs our assessment of his weaknesses and we
stand by our decision to highlight Peter Costello during the campaign.
Advertising
When it comes to Labor's advertising campaign the criticisms
are many.
We have, largely with the benefit of hindsight, been accused
of:
Being too positive, or being too negative
Focussing too much on Howard, or focussing too much on
Costello, or focussing too much on Latham, or not focussing enough on Latham
Not responding to Coalition ads and trying to set our own
agenda, or not setting our own agenda
Or, all of the above.
Much can be explained in the context of the campaign and the
limited resources we had to fight it.
One of the misconceptions of our advertising campaign is
that we should have prosecuted a range of arguments early in the six weeks —
most notably an inoculation on interest rates.
This is based on the assumption that in every week of the
campaign Labor had a large ad buy at its disposal.
The fact is, our media buy could only sustain about two
weeks worth of advertising at any level of effectiveness.
We estimated that the Coalition would outspend us by around
one and a half million dollars.
In the end it was more like two and a half to three million.
For our first ad strike we decided to identify the people
most likely to be affected by the scare campaign and looked at the other issues
of importance to them.
They were, of course, voters in the mortgage belt seats —
people who considered themselves under financial pressure from record taxes and
the rising costs of education and health.
Many of them had incomes under $52,000 and felt abandoned
after the May budget.
You might recall Labor's first ad criticised the Howard
Government's record level of taxation and promoted our tax and family payments
plan.
It ended with a message that Labor would take the pressure
off families — which became the main theme of the campaign.
This tested well, it ran well and it had the dual benefit of
also selling our family tax policy.
The bulk of Labor's remaining ad clout was targeted at the
last week before the electronic blackout.
We'd developed a strong response ad to the interest rates
campaign and we devoted 30 per cent of that last week's buy to it, with the
remaining buy split between our key positive ad and the John Howard ready to
leave concept.
As I said the day after the election, Labor always had a
more complex task than the Coalition.
We had to introduce a new leader and his policy agenda. We
had to highlight the record of the Howard Government over 8 ½ years, remind
people of the PM's imminent retirement and the prospect of Peter Costello and
inoculate against the attacks on interest rates, inexperience and Liverpool
Council.
To ignore any one of these areas would have exposed a gap in
our frontline.
All this within a limited advertising budget that was
significantly less than our opponents, and up against the 167 million dollars
of taxpayers' money spent by the Coalition last term on partisan ads such as
the Strengthening Medicare series.
This gross abuse of taxpayers' money on inoculating Howard
Government weaknesses freed them to devote all of the Liberal Parties campaign
funds to attacking us.
Labor didn't have that luxury. No political party should.
The Coalition's task was clear. Hammer Mark Latham as
inexperienced and scare the bejesus out of people on interest rates.
OUR MISTAKES
Having dealt with some of the myths about the Labor campaign
I'd now like to turn to some of the areas where Labor did make mistakes.
Many of the people in this room wrote that Labor "out
campaigned" the Coalition.
It's true that on many individual days Labor won the
day. In fact, the bulk of published
opinion lay with Labor performing better on more days than the Coalition.
Even the Daily Telegraph's highly scientific and carefully
constructed Mal Meter had us winning 14 days.
I believe both sides ran very professional campaigns and
most well informed commentators have agreed.
However, it is impossible to out campaign your opponents and
lose. The final result requires an
acknowledgement of our mistakes.
Mark Latham has already put his hand up and accepted a fair
amount of the blame.
He's highlighted that our focus was far too positive, that
we sought to argue too much on our strengths and not enough on the Government's
significant weaknesses.
In short, we failed to lock horns with the Coalition on the
vital ground of economic management and dispel the myths about interest rates.
This led to a victory of old politics, negative campaigning
and pork barrelling over the notion that you can break through from opposition
with an overwhelmingly positive agenda.
It's now my turn to accept a fair share of the
responsibility for the result.
Too much has been written that this campaign was a one-man
band.
Whilst it was true that Mark Latham was very hands on and
set a lot of our strategy, the campaign team and Parliamentary leadership
endorsed and supported his approach.
This was not a campaign where there were internal divisions
and major differences of opinion.
In fact, many noted the sense of cohesion, consultation and
cooperation.
We were determined not to run a campaign where significant
differences became the defining memory.
There were numerous strategy meetings, consultations with
state branches and discussions with the Shadow Ministry all of which supported
the broad approaches taken.
Another collective error was the view that many of our
weaknesses could be either solved in the campaign or that Mark Latham's
strengths would overcome them.
We knew we would face an attack over interest rates.
The Government had started its campaign very early in the
year.
We knew the Coalition would continue ramping up Mark
Latham's record on Liverpool Council.
Despite significant background research in areas such as
Liverpool Council and early efforts to inoculate, such as the fiscal pledge
released at the time of the budget, our mistake was to rely too much on a "wait
and see" attitude, to wait too long for the campaign dynamics to unfold.
We've
learnt the hard way that you have to fight every lie, deal with every weakness
as early and as often as it takes. As it was once famously put — 'leave no shot
unanswered'.
This campaign has shown that the three years before the
election are just as, if not more important than, the 40 long days of the
campaign proper.
THE REVIEW
So we did make mistakes, and we can and will campaign better
next time.
That's why our review of the election is so critical.
That's why a diverse group of experienced campaigners who
were not closely associated with headquarters are currently finalising their
inquiries into different parts of the campaign.
They will provide advice to the members of the National Executive
Committee who will write a report to be tabled and debated at the 23 November
meeting of the full National Executive.
It's a short, tough assessment of the campaign by people who
know their stuff and who will not hold back if they believe things could have
been done better.
This process is vital to our success. It will provide important insights and
lessons for the next campaign.
You'll notice I've devoted much of my time here today to the
strategies and dynamics of the campaign, and have largely steered clear of the
policy dimension. This is because the
shadow ministry has tasked itself with a review of policy.
From
an organisational point of view, our priority is to objectively assess the
other aspects of our campaign.
Once that's done it's just as it's important to then move on
and devote all our energies to building a majority for 2007.
WHERE TO NOW - TWO PATHS FOR LABOR
Lengthy recriminations, blame and the minutiae of who did
what to whom will only distract us from our single task — reconnecting with
those who have drifted further from us since 1998.
That old adage that disunity is political death is a lesson
best learned from the Liberal Party in the 1980s and early 1990s, whose
disarray helped sustain the Hawke and Keating governments.
Labor would do well to remember this, and to also remember
that the last time the media spoke of the 'natural party of government' was in
March 1993, only 3 years from the electoral oblivion suffered by Labor in 1996.
People wrote then that Prime Minister Keating was set to
rule throughout the 90s!
So enough of this talk that Labor won't be competitive in
2007 - we will.
But it will take the hard work and dedication of everyone in
the organisation, the caucus, and the new shadow ministry.
The first step towards victory in 2007 is to build a
credible economic message.
Another important task is to keep the Government accountable
for the spending promises they made at their campaign launch, worth an
astonishing $6 billion.
In the absence of responsible government spending, and with
the impact of debt-funded consumption, we risk higher interest rates under this
Government.
Mark's
appointment of two of our most effective performers to the key economic
portfolios is a great start.
There's much to be done to regain the trust and respect of
Australians in this and other key areas.
This is a vital task, but Labor shouldn't shy away from
prosecuting what Labor does best - advocating and implementing policies that
really do improve the health, education and skills of Australians.
Labor has two options now — the first, to turn inward on
ourselves and fade into electoral irrelevance.
The second is to unite and sell a strong message on the
economy, on national security and on the provision of the health and education
services this country needs.
I'm
confident we'll take the latter approach.
CLOSING COMMENTS AND THANKS
In closing, I'd like to briefly say a couple of things about Mark Latham, who
made Labor competitive again in only 10 months in the toughest job in
Australian politics.
In that time, Australians sat up and took notice of someone
who was prepared to go out and talk directly to people in their communities.
They took notice of a leader who comprehensively
outperformed John Howard in the election debate, who reacted to the Jakarta
bombing with poise and class and skill, and who gave them a real alternative to
the backward looking Howard Government.
Of course we're disappointed that Labor couldn't convince
enough Australians that change could take place without a rise in interest
rates, or without threat to our comparatively strong economy.
But
to all those Labor voters and supporters and volunteers out there I say keep
the faith, and we'll keep up the fight.
And to the more than 70 people who worked in the campaign
headquarters I thank them for their dedication, hard work and flair.
My respect and admiration for our team has not been
diminished by this result. What I said
to those people on the Friday night before the election remains true today.
Those people will never be given the credit they deserve for
such a terrific effort during an unusually long and difficult campaign.
I want to thank Mike Kaiser, the Assistant National
Secretary, who remains one of Labor's great campaigners.
I'd also like to thank the State and Territory Secretaries
for their support, assistance and their cohesion — both before and after the
result.
In particular, I'd like to thank Mark Arbib from New South
Wales and Erik Locke from Victoria for their support and sound judgement.
One of the only things I agree with from Brian Loughnane's
address here is that you learn more from defeat than from victory.
We lost, we made mistakes, and we'll learn from them in
order to give this country a better government — a Labor government — in 2007.
